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Abstract 
 
NASA’s exploration program envisions the utilization of a Deep Space Habitat (DSH) for human 
exploration of the space environment in the vicinity of Mars and/or asteroids. Communication latencies  
with ground control of as long as 20+ minutes make it imperative that DSH operations be highly 
autonomous, as any telemetry-based detection of a systems problem on Earth could well occur too late to 
assist the crew with the problem. A DSH-based development program has been initiated to develop and test 
the automation technologies necessary to support highly autonomous DSH operations.  
 
One such technology is a fault management tool to support performance monitoring of vehicle systems 
operations and to assist with real-time decision making in connection with operational anomalies and 
failures. Toward that end, we are developing Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS), a tool that 
combines dynamic and interactive graphical representations of spacecraft systems, systems modeling, 
automated diagnostic analysis and root cause identification, system and mission impact assessment, and 
mitigation procedure identification to help spacecraft operators (both flight controllers and crew) 
understand and respond to anomalies more effectively. In this paper, we describe four major architecture 
elements of ACAWS: Anomaly Detection, Fault Isolation, System Effects Analysis, and Graphic User 
Interface (GUI), and how these elements work in concert with each other and with other tools to provide 
fault management support to both the controllers and crew. We then describe recent evaluations and tests 
of ACAWS on the DSH testbed. The results of these tests support the feasibility and strength of our 
approach to failure management automation and enhanced operational autonomy. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The scope of this paper is a description of the Advanced Caution and Warning System 
(ACAWS) – a fault management tool designed to alert both flight controllers and crew of 
system anomalies and to guide them in the process of fault isolation and repair. The 
description of the tool is followed by a report on tests that were conducted on the ground-
based Deep Space Habitat, an analog for a system where this kind of automation will be 
crucial.  
 
Four major components of ACAWS are described in sections 3.1-3.4. These are modules 
for a) Anomaly Detection, whose function is to learn how the system typically behaves 
and to inform operators if current system behavior is unusual; b) Fault Detection and 
Isolation, which uses a system model to diagnose components that have failed; c) System 
Effects, which identifies components that will be impacted by failures; and d) Graphical 
User Interface which presents system views and diagnostic information in appropriate 
flexible formats to ground operators and astronauts. 
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In section 4, we describe related work in Fault Management. Two tools in use at NASA: 
CRANS and SEaCLIF are compared with ACAWS with respect to differences in scope 
and functionality. 
 
Finally, in section 5, we describe three evaluations of the ACAWS system that have been 
performed using the Deep Space Habitat (DSH). The first evaluation was part of Desert 
Research and Technology Studies (D-RATS) in September 2011; the second evaluation 
was part of the Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) test in June 2012, and the last 
evaluation was part of the Mission Operations Test (MOT) in September 2012. These 
tests built upon each other and served to direct the development of the system. 
 
We conclude with an overall assessment of the current state of the tool and with plans for 
future work. 
 
 
2. The ACAWS system: goals and philosophy 
 
The Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS) is a fault management tool that 
provides the following capabilities: 
• Dynamic and interactive graphical representations of spacecraft systems 
• Systems modeling 
• Automated diagnostic analysis and root cause identification 
• System and mission impact assessment 
• Procedure and flight rule (FR) identification 
• Interaction with other tools to help spacecraft operators (both flight controllers 
and crew) understand and respond to anomalies more effectively.  
 
Each of these capabilities provides critical support for monitoring the performance of 
vehicle systems and real-time decision making by Mission Control Center (MCC) flight 
controllers and crew when faced with spacecraft anomalies and failures.  
 
In addition to real-time mission support, ACAWS’ capability to create and interact with 
malfunction scenarios offer significant opportunities to support the analysis and training 
requirements of crewed missions. Thus, the goals of the ACAWS development task are: 
• Develop the technologies to support vehicle operators as they plan for, train for, 
and fly a spacecraft mission. 
• Develop an infrastructure that allows reuse and integration of multiple products, 
enabling the operator to focus on accomplishing mission tasks with minimal need 
for managing multiple software tools. 
• Understand what the operators’ needs are, including but not limited to the 
following: a) what and how existing MCC tools can be integrated, b) what 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) technology can be used as is and 
what needs to be extended, and c) what is an effective concept of operations that 
incorporates ISHM technologies. 
The product of the task is not just a prototype system. Equally important are the 
associated lessons learned in developing it.  
 The focus of ACAWS is on the needs of both flight controllers and onboard crew. 
Although we expect flight controllers to continue to assist a crew in low-Earth orbit in 
dealing with system malfunctions, for future deep-space missions the crew will need to 
accomplish some tasks autonomously due to communication time delays. We expect that 
providing similar tools to the flight controllers and the crew – albeit perhaps with a 
different level of detail and different display formats or interaction methods – could 
enable more effective and efficient collaboration between the two groups as well as 
heightened situational awareness. In the remainder of this paper, the word operators is 
used to refer to either flight controllers or crew. 
 
 
3. Major ACAWS Components 
 
ACAWS encompasses four major modules: anomaly detection, fault detection and 
isolation, system effects analysis, and a Graphical User Interface (GUI). The modules 
communicate with each other and with the DSH via a data distribution middleware; in 
this case, we use the Internet Communications Engine (ICE) [1] middleware. Additional 
modules are currently under development, depicted in the ACAWS architecture diagram 
shown in Figure 3.1. They will not be described in this paper. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: ACAWS architecture. Modules surrounded by dashed line rectangles are external to ACAWS. 
  
3.1 The Anomaly Detection Module 
 
The Anomaly Detection module uses the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) [2a,b] to 
automatically learn how the system typically behaves and to inform operators if current 
system behavior is unusual. An IMS application has two pieces: training and monitoring. 
Training is done off-line and monitoring can be done onboard (on-line) or off-line. The 
goal of the training step is to learn how the system normally behaves. The input is a data 
set representing nominal system operation. The output of the IMS training process is a 
list of clusters that define nominal operations. A cluster is defined as a rectangular N-
dimensional box (where N is the number of parameters used for training), with the cluster 
encoding the two extreme points of the box. IMS is trained off-line but can be retrained if 
system characteristics, and thus expected behavior, change, or as additional data is 
collected. 
 
The goal of the monitoring step is to determine if the system is behaving differently than 
during training. The monitoring step extracts the relevant parameters from the incoming 
real-time system data (via the ACAWS Anomaly Detection module), normalizes and 
weights them accordingly, as was done during training, and then compares the incoming 
vector to the list of clusters generated during training. It outputs deviation scores, the 
distance between the vector and the nearest point contained in a cluster for the vector as a 
whole (a composite score) and for each parameter separately. These deviation scores, 
indicating how distant current conditions are from conditions categorized as nominal 
during training, are sent back to the communications middleware and are displayed on the 
ACAWS GUI. 
  
IMS follows a data driven approach and does not require a hand-built model. Although 
helpful for some training tasks, a system expert is not required in developing an 
application. Moreover, IMS is trained on only nominal system data; it does not require 
failure data. For situations in which archived data or a high-fidelity simulator is available, 
IMS provides opportunities to develop a monitoring capability for complex systems that 
may be too difficult to characterize with model-based and rule-based systems. 
 
 
3.2 The Fault Detection and Isolation Module 
 
The ACAWS fault isolation module utilizes TEAMS-RDS [3] – one component of a suite 
of tools developed by Qualtech Systems Inc. (QSI) with support from NASA’s Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. The TEAMS suite of tools supports 
systems engineering, systems design and testability, automated diagnosis, and guided 
troubleshooting. TEAMS is a model-based reasoning system, meaning that relationships 
among various failure modes and readings from system instrumentation (observations) 
are captured in a model used by a run-time diagnostic engine. Below we describe a recent 
extension of our modeling work in which the TEAMS model forms the basis of failure 
consequence analysis to provide operators with insight into the system effects of a 
component fault. This System Effects module can also be used in “what-if” mode, 
allowing the operator to determine in advance the effect of possible faults and 
malfunctions. 
 
For real-time diagnosis, a dependency matrix (D-matrix) is generated from the model. 
The D-matrix is a two-dimensional matrix of failure modes (causes) and effects (“tests”; 
things that can be observed). Input to TEAMS is a vector of binary (true/false, pass/fail) 
health status indicators (“tests”), as computed by the DSH software and supplemented by 
the ACAWS fault detection module. DSH software provides observations on whether 
telemetry parameters are valid and whether they are in bounds. ACAWS-fault detection 
supplements these observations with heartbeat data providing observations of when data 
was last received from a component.  
 
The TEAMS-RDS diagnostic engine uses system observations (e.g., whether a sensor 
value is within (“pass”) or exceeds (“fail”) a predetermined threshold) and determines 
which components could cause the current pattern of pass/fail system observations. The 
fault isolation module manages connection to the communication middleware (ICE) to 
retrieve the real-time telemetry or DSH-computed system observations, marshals the data 
into the appropriate form, sends it to TEAMS, and posts the diagnosis back to ICE.  
 
ACAWS also exploits the TEAMS guided troubleshooting capability. Systems designers 
often cannot afford to (or choose not to) provide adequate instrumentation to fully 
disambiguate the cause of every failure. When the observations signature of a system 
failure cannot be fully disambiguated with telemetered (sensed) observations, TEAMS 
produces an ambiguity group, that is, the group of potential diagnoses that explain the 
failure signature. When an unambiguous failure is determined, ACAWS recommends a 
procedure to recover functionality (if possible) or to work around the loss. 
 
The ACAWS recommended procedure is published on ICE and received by a procedure 
display tool – WebPD – developed at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), which the 
operator uses to step through the procedure instructions. The troubleshooting procedure 
ends with a request for the manual observation. This observation is sent, via ICE, to 
ACAWS where it is used for disambiguation. The loop continues until an unambiguous 
diagnosis is determined or ACAWS runs out of recommended tests for the operator to 
perform. The telemetry values, diagnosis, and recommended procedures are each  
displayed on the ACAWS GUI described in section 3.4. 
 
 
3.3 The System Effects Module 
 
The purpose of the System Effects (SysEffects) module is to determine what components 
will be impacted given a particular component fault or malfunction. “Impact” is defined 
as some change in functionality due to the absence of a needed resource (e.g. power), 
where the component itself is still functionally intact, i.e. capable of resuming its normal 
functionality if the needed resource is restored. A light bulb that is dark due to a power 
black out is “impacted”. This is different from a bulb that has burned out (i.e. “faulted”). 
Note that the words “fault” and “failure” are used interchangeably for the purpose of this 
paper.  
 
Our approach to building the SysEffects module was to make use of existing systems 
models as opposed to creating new ones. We felt that building separate models for 
diagnosis and failure consequences would be prone to inconsistencies, so we used the 
TEAMS diagnostic model as a starting point. 
 
Unfortunately for our purposes, TEAMS models link different components for the 
purpose of building a dependency matrix that links faults to test points, as opposed to 
establishing a causal chain from component to component. The TEAMS model structure 
is thus necessary but not sufficient to provide the framework for SysEffects reasoning. To 
enable SysEffects, each component in the TEAMS model needed to be classified as 
“failed”, “impacted” or “nominal”. A classification of “failed” is provided by the 
diagnostic system. If a given component has been declared faulted, the system needs to 
determine whether an “impact signal” should be spread or not. If a “downstream” 
component receives an impact signal, the system needed to determine whether this 
component was actually impacted or not (there are components that receive an impact 
signal but, because of their particular functionality, are not actually impacted). These 
various determinations were embedded in Boolean logic inserted in the model 
components, within text fields assigned to that purpose, based on the modeler’s 
knowledge of the system and of the functionality of particular components. The behavior 
of different components is shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: TEAMS model needs to be extended to enable SysEffects.  
 
    
Figure 3.3: Key for component types that need to be handled as exceptions. 
Ignoring syntax details, this is how these Boolean expressions are used in the algorithm 
described in the next section: 
1. If the component is faulty, the Booleans indicate the following  
a. The identified output or outputs should be set to FALSE 
b. This component should not be put on the impact list 
2. If the component is impacted, the Booleans indicate the following: 
a. The identified output or outputs should be set to same values as the inputs 
– i.e. this component is “pass-through”, i.e. it will spread the impact – or it 
should be negated – i.e. this component will not spread the impact. 
b. This component should be put on the impact list – or not   
3. For all other components, all Boolean expressions are ignored. 
 
The basic impact propagation algorithm described above is complicated by some 
additional features of TEAMS models: modes, fault uncertainty and the possibility of 
multiple faults. These features are handled as explained in sections 3.3.1-3.3.3.  
 
3.3.1. Mode-aware impact assessment 
 
It is typical of a system to be operating in different modes, each with different diagnostic 
strategies and outcomes. Essentially each mode requires a different system model. 
Instead of changing models for different modes, TEAMS uses specialized modules called 
“switches” that change the flow of signals as required by different system modes. These 
“switches” are not actual physical components, rather model devices that represent 
different types of operations. Switches are represented by boxes with one input and two 
different possible outputs, or two different possible inputs and one output. For example, 
in the DSH model, the ability to use either the Primary or Secondary 24VDC source is 
captured by way of a switch consisting of 2 input ports and one output port. The two 
input ports of the switch are connected to the corresponding PDU-B1 ports that represent 
24VDC Primary and Secondary sources. When the system uses a primary source we are 
in particular mode, and when the system uses instead a secondary source we are in a 
different mode. The setting of these switches determines which mode we are in. Any 
particular mode can be determined by the setting of several switches. 
 
The SysEffects software extracts the operation modes and translates them into 
propagation Boolean expression for each of the affected switches. Since TEAMS 
switches do not actually represent a physical they are not included in the impact list. 
 
3.3.2 Certainty dependent fault handling: 
 
In order to handle ambiguity groups in TEAMS, the concept of "certainty" of faults was 
introduced. In the most recent implementation, a component fault can either be in the 
"Confirmed Failed (CF)" or "Possibly Failed (PF)" category. As the name suggests, a 
fault tagged as "CF" is one that TEAMS can tell for sure has failed based on the test 
results. In the event that TEAMS is unable to identify faults unambiguously, it has the 
ability to narrow down to a small subset of faults (ambiguity group) each of which will 
then be tagged as "PF". By definition an ambiguity group will consist of more that one 
possible fault. 
 
3.3.3 Handling multiple faults: 
 
In scenarios where TEAMS is able to pinpoint multiple faults as confirmed failures or 
when the best it could do is to generate an ambiguity list of candidate faults, it will be 
necessary for the system effects application to perform graph search for each fault and 
then aggregate the impact list generated by each search step. The aggregation step used to 
combine impact list for multiple faults depends on the "certainty" of the faults. In the case 
where all the faults are tagged as "CF", the aggregation step is simply the union of the 
impact lists of each confirmed failure mode. This union could be used to assist the 
operator with next-worst-failure analysis. If we have an ambiguity group where each fault 
is tagged as "PF", the aggregation step yields two lists of impacted components: the first 
is an intersection of the individual impact lists and the second is the cumulative list of all 
the impacted components without their intersection. The intersection would be used to 
assist the operator in determining what system components have been lost regardless of 
how the ambiguity gets resolved. 
 
3.3.4 SysEffects software structure 
 
The SysEffects software consists of three main components: 
1. TEAMS diagnostic model parser 
2. SysEffects reasoner 
3. Communication mechanism that connects SysEffects to other modules in the 
system such as the ACAWS Fault Detection and Isolation module and the 
ACAWS GUI. 
 
The front-end parser reads and converts an XML
1
 version of the TEAMS model into a 
                                                
1
 XML = Extensible Markup Language, a markup language that defines a set of rules for 
encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and machine-readable. 
SysEffects representation that is primarily a graph whose nodes are TEAMS "nodes" that 
are made up of hierarchical components, failure modes and switches. The SysEffects 
reasoner is a depth-first graph search mechanism that starts its traversal from the graph 
node corresponding to the failure mode whose impact needs to be determined. The 
reasoner maintains an internal stack to hold the components being processed as well as a 
separate impact list that will be populated with the components that have been 
determined to be impacted. The reasoner publishes the final impact list when all affected 
nodes in the graph have been traversed. The communication mechanism enables the 
SysEffects application to service requests for impact analysis from either the ACAWS 
diagnosis engine, as will be the case during live operation, or from the ACAWS GUI 
during a user-fail mode system analysis. After performing a graph search as described in 
the previous section the results are broadcast into the communication layer and are picked 
up by the ACAWS GUI. 
 
The SysEffects software components are generic and can be reused for other NASA 
programs. The model is specific to the system of interest and needs to be developed with 
SysEffects (and the operator displays, as described later) in mind or enhanced after the 
fact. 
 
 
3.4 The Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
 
Design of the ACAWS GUI is based on the Model View Controller (MVC) software 
architecture. The controllers manage the data aspect of the components, and are 
responsible for data retrieval, processing and mapping, and accepting the operator’s 
inputs. The views are responsible for updating display panes and rendering the 
components. The views also respond to the controller’s requests.  The models hold data, 
control, view and auxiliary information together to notify the view to update when the 
state or data changes. The purpose of using such an architecture is to separate the view 
from the model so they can independently change or be modified, in a one-to-many 
relationship. For example, when the model logic changes, the view part of the code does 
not necessarily need to change. One model can have multiple views, which can help the 
operator understand different aspects of the model. There are multiple types of window 
panes in the framework to display and take operator action on different data types. Each 
of the window panes utilizes the MVC architecture. For example, the telemetry data 
provides sensor values that can be displayed on the sensor data pane. The same data can 
also be displayed on the block diagram but using a different view, in this case, just 
whether the data is available or missing, not the data’s value. One model with two views 
can be realized easily with this MVC architecture. 
 
The ACAWS GUI was developed in Java. Display screens were programmed in Java 
Swing, and an open-source software package – MyDoggy – that provides window 
allocation and docking capabilities. Docking means that a window can be 
dragged/dropped on a “docked” location and stay there relative to other windows, where 
it will move, resize, etc. along with those windows. When it is undocked, the window can 
once again be manipulated individually. Some customized work has been done to add 
features such as saving the configuration of the working environment, docking multiple 
windows around a main window, and partitioning different areas of windows to group 
them together.  The ACAWS GUI framework simplifies dynamic management of 
multiple working windows at run time.  The ACAWS GUI has multiple types of window 
panes to display different types of information with different kinds of user interaction. All 
types of window panes are derived from the dockable framework so that all windows are 
dockable and manageable in the same fashion. 
 
One of the key objectives for the general framework of the interface is providing 
flexibility to support the operator to work how she/he wants rather than dictating a certain 
approach.  
 
The ACAWS GUI was used by flight controllers in the NASA JSC Mission Control 
Center (MCC) Operations Test Facility (OTF) as well as the crew in the DSH. Note that 
each of the ACAWS modules is independent of the GUI, connected only via the 
communications layer. Going forward, this independence makes it possible to easily 
integrate ACAWS modules with, for instance, Orion displays currently being designed.  
 
 
4. Related work 
 
There are two other major Failure Management systems in use in MCC: the Configurable 
Real-time Analysis System (CRANS) tool and System Effects and Capability Losses 
From Inserted Failures (SEaCLIF).  
 
The major difference between CRANS [4]  and ACAWS is that CRANS is a rule based 
Expert System, whereas ACAWS reasons from an actual system model. CRANS decision 
making is based on rules created and maintained by the operators, based on their 
experience, extensive studies of the vehicle architecture and failure mode documentation 
and simulation. “What if” scenarios can be followed as well. CRANS has been used for 
the International Space Station (ISS), and that experience indicated that keeping the 
system updated is a challenge, as changes are constantly being made and their 
consequences are not being derived automatically from documentation and reference 
manuals. In Mission Operations these are maintained by a “reconfiguration” group 
(RECON), and form the basis for all flight and ground operations and training. A quick 
and verifiable derivation of CRANS logic files from RECON products would be highly 
desirable. The aim of ACAWS is to address this shortcoming by using the actual 
spacecraft models for failure analysis. 
 
CRANS is able to find single causes from multiple failures by analyzing a logic tree, built 
by the users, where items are related to each other by Boolean operators. The user can 
declare these items as on or off, failed or nominal, and see the effect of these settings on 
other items. The outputs are in the form of user defined matrices of color boxes 
representing the item or groups of items in the logic tree. The program is written in C, 
with development begun in 1992.  
 
SEaCLIF, by J&P Systems Engineering [5], is a tool for integration of classic 
engineering data, such as certification limits and detailed design drawings, with 
operations data, such as crew procedures and flight rules, and with SR&QA (Safety, 
Reliability and Quality Assurance) engineering products, such as Hazard Reports, Failure 
Modes and Effects Analyses.  
 
Integration is provided via a logic network that captures relationships between vehicle or 
system components, requirements, and hardware or software needed to implement the 
requirements. The logic network also captures relationships between hardware and 
software modules required for system control, hazards and associated causes, and power 
generation and distribution.  
 
SEaCLIF provides the capability to analyze cross-subsystem effects due to component 
failures or state changes, and provides hot-links to existing web-based data bases. It is 
currently in use by NASA JSC's Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate in 
support of flight operations. The fundamental difference between SEaCLIF and both 
ACAWS and CRANS is that SEaCLIF is not a real-time time system, rather a tool for 
information management and data integration and analysis. In particular, it enables 
extensive “what if” reasoning, based on system simulation, looking at fault scenarios and 
consequences for mission objectives. 
 
 
5. The Deep Space Habitat (DSH) ACAWS Evaluations 
 
Three evaluations of the ACAWS system have been performed using the DSH: as part of 
Desert Research and Technology Studies (D-RATS) in September 2011; as part of the 
Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) test in June 2012; and as part of the Mission 
Operations Test (MOT) in September 2012. 
 
Developing a diagnostic model for the full DSH is out of scope for this task. To select a 
reasonable subset of the system for ACAWS evaluation purposes, we considered a 
number of characteristics for a reasonable investigative domain. First, the diagnosis of 
selected failure scenarios needs to be complex, both in the failure and the annunciation of 
the failure. Some desirable characteristics of such a failure include the following:  
• Requires substantial system knowledge to perform manually  
• Has a failure signature that looks similar to the signature of other possible 
failures, thereby providing a potential ambiguity of which failure happened 
• Requires analysis to determine the failure, but is not so complex that it is 
difficult to explain in a demonstration presentation 
 
Second, the selected subsystem needs to have enough sensors to allow for some 
automated diagnosis capability, either an unambiguous diagnosis for which a recovery 
procedure would restore functionality, or an ambiguous diagnosis with a small group of 
possible failures that are explained by the telemetered data and possible operator 
observations that could further disambiguate to the actual (seeded) failure.  
 
The last consideration for investigative domain selection was criticality of the (seeded) 
failure. We wanted a failure that requires immediate resolution. This would ensure that 
the crew would exercise ACAWS in an on-board capacity rather than deferring the 
problem to an MCC/OTF controller. 
 
With these objectives in mind, we selected a subset of the power subsystem. A number of 
failures in the power system have similar signatures, leading to complexity in the failure 
and annunciation of the failure. Further complexity arises because loss of power results in 
loss of data that is needed to determine system state. It requires both sensor data and 
operator input to diagnose failures. It includes both hardware failures and software 
failures, and the ability to differentiate between the two. Finally, the failures are each 
very significant but not catastrophic, and their impacts vary from fairly isolated to fairly 
broad. 
 
D-RATS: During D-RATS [6], the DSH was in the Arizona desert, connected via a 
simulated time delay to flight controllers in Houston. The main purpose of the D-RATS 
ACAWS tests was to mature ACAWS on a real system in an operational setting rather 
than on a well-behaved “sandbox” system. Additionally, three operators (flight 
controllers) evaluated it for workload, ease of processing/ease of operation, information 
display, display format features, potential additions to ACAWS, and evaluation of 
operations with time delay effects. Workload assessments and user opinions were very 
favorable. Lessons learned from D-RATS informed subsequent development.  
 
AMO: The Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) [7] project conducted an empirical 
investigation of the impact of time delay on today’s mission operations, and of the effect 
of processes and mission support tools designed to mitigate time-delay related impacts. 
ACAWS was part of the evaluation of technologies that could potentially facilitate 
autonomous DSH operations.  
 
The same (seeded) DSH Electrical Power System (EPS) failure scenarios were used for 
AMO as for D-RATS. Based on lessons learned from D-RATS, the ACAWS failure 
detection and isolation module was made more robust. Additionally, a second diagnosis 
engine (the Hybrid Diagnostic Engine, HyDE [8]) was integrated into ACAWS to handle 
failures in a simulated water transfer system. The integration was straightforward and 
involved connecting HyDE to the communications layer (ICE) and adding another 
display pane to the ACAWS GUI to represent the water transfer system.  
 
Flight controller comments following the test indicated that both workload reduction and 
a reduction in the need for coordination resulted from ACAWS: “ACAWS provided 
useful direction for the crew, so there was little need for us to do anything other than 
concur.” Similarly, crew comments were both positive and indicated that the tool 
allowed the crew to proceed more autonomously than in Baseline: “ACAWS told me 
which procedure to work which the ground later confirmed but I had already completed 
the procedure.” 
 
The last quote raises important issues of ACAWS-related impacts on crew situation 
awareness and operational autonomy, particularly as they might apply to mitigating 
detrimental effects of time delay: “The time delay had little impact because ACAWS ran 
most of the procedure.  Since the ground and crew can follow ACAWS, it was pretty 
seamless.  MCC and DSH were able to come to common agreement with ACAWS.  MCC 
and DSH statused each other via voice calls and texting.” 
 
MOT: During the Mission Operations Test, four people (one an active member of 
NASA’s current astronaut corps, the others astronaut surrogates) lived inside the DSH at 
JSC for ten days. These crewmembers communicated with flight controllers in the OTF 
over a simulated time delay. The goals of ACAWS participation in the Mission 
Operations Test (MOT) were two-fold: (1) test ACAWS integrated with Intelligent 
Controls technology, and (2) test the ACAWS SysEffects module, including user-fail 
“what-if” scenarios.   
 
The MOT version of the DSH EPS was modified to support ACAWS and Intelligent 
Controls technology testing. In particular, redundant power sources were added for both 
the 24 VDC power supply and the 28 VDC converter, as shown by the diagram in Figure 
3.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: MOT DSH Redundant Power Configuration. 
In the MOT tests, ACAWS was used to diagnose a simulation-injected failure in any of 
the four ports powering the converter or power supply. The Intelligent Controls software 
received the ACAWS failure message and provided an advisory to the DSH crew that led 
them through a reconfiguration procedure in one of three modes, as follows: 
1. Manual: crew performs all tasks using a procedure  
2. Semi-automated: crew monitors procedure, confirms and allows software to 
execute reconfiguration 
3. Automated: crew is not involved in the procedure, software executes the 
reconfiguration and notifies crew after the fact. 
The importance of recovering from the selected failures was increased by specifying that 
some of the downstream sensors (CO2 and O2) are considered critical and must be 
recovered within 10 minutes to assure crew safety. 
 
ACAWS GUI instances ran inside the DSH and were used by the crew in some failure 
scenarios. ACAWS GUI instances also ran in the OTF at a number of controller 
positions; they were used to increase controllers’ situational awareness of DSH 
operations. 
 
For each of the test runs, the diagnosis and effects of one of the four (seeded) failures 
were shown on the GUI. An example of a port powering the 24VDC power supply is 
shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Simulation-injected failure, correct diagnosis, and failure effects shown in three views of 
the DSH power system. 
 
The MOT version of ACAWS could also be used in off-line failure analysis (“what-if”) 
capability, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3: Offline "user-fail" GUI mode showing three views of operator-induced failure and its 
effects. 
The figure illustrates the different symbology utilized by the GUI to distinguish real-time 
operations mode from off-line failure analysis mode. Note that the same failure is shown 
in both cases – a failure of one of the redundant ports powering the 24VDC power 
supply. In the “user-fail” GUI mode, the operator has “injected” that failure, as shown by 
the orange “UF” badge overlayed on the ACAWS confirmed-failed icon (stylized red 
“X” in a yellow triangle on a blue rectangle). The GUI transforms that induced failure 
into a SysEffects request which it posts to ICE. The same request message is used for 
real-time SysEffects requests, allowing the SysEffects module to be agnostic to failure 
source. The GUI matches the SysEffects reply with its request (since many operators 
could concurrently be performing “what-if” analyses) and displays those effects, 
similarly adding a “UF” badge to the ACAWS effects icon (stylized “E” in a blue 
rectangle). Moreover, the GUI status bar is orange and specifies “User Fail Mode”, as is 
the perimeter of each pane.   
 
Off-line failure analysis mode, as designed for MOT, can be used for training. The 
trainee can inject any single failure of interest, hypothesize on the effects of that failure 
on the rest of the system, and then verify the hypothesis – and hence his/her system (e.g., 
DSH) understanding – via ACAWS.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
We addressed a need for greater automation in fault management with a tool designed to 
alert both flight controllers and crew of system anomalies and to guide them in the 
process of fault isolation and repair. This Advanced Caution and Warning System 
provides capabilities for a) dynamic and interactive graphical representations of 
spacecraft systems b) systems modeling c) automated diagnostic analysis and root cause 
identification d) system impact assessment e) procedure and flight rule (FR) 
identification and f) interaction with other tools for more effective response to anomalies. 
 
ACAWS has been tested and matured as a part of three technology evaluations in the 
context of the ground-based Deep Space Habitat. These were the Desert Research and 
Technology Studies (D-RATS) in September 2011, the Autonomous Mission Operations 
(AMO) test in June 2012, and the Mission Operations Test (MOT) in September 2012. 
 
Future work is planned for all the modules described above. For the Anomaly Detection 
module this includes developing an Alert Logic Filter to filter out data spikes and issue 
alerts only when a specified number of sequential incoming vectors are anomalous. We 
will also be working toward automating the training step so that it can be accomplished 
without operator involvement. This would enable a “bare-bones” Anomaly Detection 
module to be deployed using minimal training data. As the system continues to operate 
nominally, the knowledge base could automatically be improved to incorporate that 
system behavior. This capability would increase the likelihood of IMS training data 
keeping up with acknowledged system behavior changes, either system characteristics – 
and thus expected behavior – change, or as additional data is collected. 
 
There are many options for future work within the fault detection and isolation module. 
For example, QSI has been modifying TEAMS to provide additional capabilities based 
on our experiences. We will explore incorporating capabilities in both single-fault 
assumption diagnosis and in next-best-test recommendation. Many of our experiences 
have uncovered the need for a more robust fault detection layer. We will explore 
effective ways to characterize incoming system data and develop better data cleaning and 
filtering routines. We will also investigate effective ways to handle system redundancy, 
support multiple concurrent failures, deal with transitions from a failure state back to a 
nominal state, and incorporate contextual information such as phase-of-flight.  
 
SysEffects capabilities, including handling of multiple failures and ambiguous diagnoses, 
need to be fully integrated with decision tools for mission operators. A different approach 
is also being explored with models that show cause-effect relationships more directly 
than done in the TEAMS tool. A software system called IDA (Interactive Digraph 
Analysis) developed by one the authors is being tested for its ability to meet operator 
requirements which focus on component failures and consequences while still using 
TEAMS models, which are mainly based on relating failures to test points. 
 
Currently, we are extending ACAWS to allow more complex user-fail queries, including 
setting the state of the system (e.g., turning ports ON/OFF, selecting which redundant 
path is active), composing multiple failure scenarios, and performing hybrid real-
time/user-fail failure analysis. These extensions will support more complex training 
scenarios and enable operators to perform next-worst-failure analysis, that is, determining 
the additional failure (out of the myriad that are possible) that would maximally impact 
current crew activities or mission safety. In terms of the GUI, future work includes 
extending it to support complex failure analysis queries, restructuring it to more easily 
support transition to a different system, and enhancing the symbology to reflect 
additional ACAWS capabilities.  
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